

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC No. 04719-85/1
24 September 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM:




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Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Europe

SUBJECT:

Warning and Forecast Report for Europe

1. Attached is my report to the DCI based on our meeting held 18 September 1985. If there are any significant amendments or additions you would wish to make, please let me know.

2. Next month's warning meeting will be held 23 October 1985 at 1015 in room 7-E-62, CIA Headquarters. Please have your clearances passed and call  with names of the attendees by noon, 22 October 1985.

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3. I also encourage you to phone in suggestions for the agenda and proposals to make opening presentations. It would be helpful to have your comments for the next meeting by Monday, 7 October 1985.

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Attachment:

a/s

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC No. 04719-85
24 September 1985MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central IntelligenceFROM: [REDACTED]
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Europe

SUBJECT: September Warning and Forecast Meeting

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I. Main Discussion ItemsA. France: On the Eve of Gorbachev's Arrival

1. Discussion: President Mitterrand will probably use the Gorbachev's 2-3 October visit to stress France's continuing special role in international affairs and thus undercut French critics of his more openly pro-NATO stance. But several factors mitigate against major improvements in French-Soviet relations.

Similar views--on issues like CDE, Central America and generalized formulas on the need for detente--are likely to be the core of publicly-expressed agreements during the visit. Analysts suggest that Gorbachev, as he frequently has in the past, may dust off old gestures in order to hint at new flexibility on the status of French and British missiles in SALT negotiations. But they expect no major Soviet concessions. In addition, Mitterrand will be cool towards Soviet test moratorium proposals and, despite his own well-known reservations, he is not likely to join the Soviets' public attack on SDI out of deference to lobbies at home and to Allies. Mitterrand will be wary of Soviet efforts to drive wedges, particularly so regarding the French-FRG link.

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[REDACTED] that there will be no communique on the visit suggest that there will be no broad-ranging agreements. Paris will be skeptical of Soviet trade blandishments as past promises on lowering the trade deficit have proved empty gestures. In private talks, the French are likely to firmly restate their views on disputed issues like Afghanistan and human rights.

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2. Warning Note: As Gorbachev plays to the media and the wider European audience, he may make other gestures--like a new promise to meet the Dutch conditions on reducing deployed SS-20s to 378 in time to interfere with their INF deployment decision on 1 November. He may also propose joint cooperation on European-based new technology development in non-military fields as some of his Warsaw Pact minions--like East Germany and Hungary--already have.

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B. Spain: The NATO Referendum

1. Discussion:

Premier Gonzalez remains strongly committed to expanding Spain's security and economic ties to the West. Neither urgings from Socialist advisors who fear divisive splits within the party nor the misgivings of the allies are likely to dissuade him from holding the referendum he promised on NATO membership.

Polls continue to run against NATO despite the projected favorable impact of EC accession and progress on repatriating Gibraltar. Gonzalez's slow start in campaigning for his pro-NATO stance gives opponents an early advantage. In addition, opposition conservatives who are otherwise pro-NATO are standing idle while the issue erodes his immense personal popularity. The referendum also faces tough sledding as the prospects are that NATO opponents are more likely to vote than NATO supporters.

- A low turnout at the referendum might result in too strong anti-NATO vote to allow him to ignore the result.
- Therefore his best--and increasingly thin--hope would be to seek a large voter turnout and try to chip away marginal groups from the isolationist hard core in hopes of a closer, less conclusive outcome.

If this calculation fails, Gonzalez, still by far the dominant political figure in Spain, might have to test his own popularity by calling an early election-cum-NATO referendum.

2. Warning Note: These developments also bode ill for bilateral talks on mutual security issues which are to begin in October. In the search for the right political formulas, Gonzalez has tried diversionary themes--like the need for the US to reduce its presence--which have only increased the demands of anti-Western

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forces. As a result he is now likely to press the US for major concessions on bases in a hope--probably illusory--that this will make a critical difference in the atmosphere for the NATO referendum.

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C. Upcoming Developments in Poland

1. Discussion: Despite several several new efforts to establish credibility for its "normalization" process, the Jaruzelski regime probably will enter its pre-congress preparations next spring with at least the same burden of dubious legitimacy, programatic inertia and popular resistance.

At home, underground Solidarity has declared a boycott campaign against the Sejm elections on 13 October. (Lech Walesa as leader of the above-ground movement will keep a tactical silence rather than violate legal restraints.) There is already an impact through leaflets and notices illegally inserted into Polish state television programing.

- The regime's new "electoral reform" is widely unpopular and from all appearances the new deputies will be even less representative and likely to talk back than their predecessors.
- Jaruzelski will need to use pressure to achieve a face-saving voter turnout--i.e. about 70 percent rather than the 50 percent projected by Solidarity.
- The Church has refuted official claims that its silence on the election connotes approval. Cardinal Glemp in late August made a uncharacteristically defiant sermon against the party and he will be conspicuously absent--visiting the Vatican--during the elections.

Afterward, the authorities must run another gauntlet of late year anniversaries which usually enflame anti-regime feeling. The newest will be the first anniversary in late October of Father Popeliuszko's murder by the secret police.

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Jaruzelski's UNGA visit in October will be his first participation in a gathering of international statesmen since martial law. The trip is already marred by controversy as Spain has refuted Warsaw's allegations of an imminent meeting between Gonzalez and Jaruzelski. The Pope recently scotched any chance of a Jaruzelski stopoff in Rome on his return to Poland. And Cardinal Glemp's unofficial visit to the US just before Jaruzelski will upstage his UNGA visit.

2. Warning Note: The buildup of regime pressures and popular disaffection probably will increase the ever-present danger of missteps and a new crisis. We would expect the Polish authorities to be tough but wary of excesses during the runup to the Geneva summit. One of the last things Gorbachev wants is a crisis in East Europe at that time.

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II. Monitoring Item

A. Greek Tactics on the F-16 Deal

1. Discussion: Prime Minister Papandreu appears serious in his campaign to acquire 40 F-16s for the Hellenic Air Force. He knows that concessionary FMS credits will be hard to match elsewhere, that the military wants the F-16s to help balance the Turkish military's complement of the same aircraft and that a US refusal on security grounds would supply his political opponents with potent arguments against him. We project that Papandrou will likely:

- try to disarm critics in the USG by meeting some immediate and finite security tightening recommendations from a GSOMIA team.
- allow other bilateral issues--like his still unclear intentions regarding US military bases--to be informally linked as a quid pro quo to the US F-16 decision.

His main immediate goal is probably to gain a sign of progress on the F-16 sale in order to staunch accusations that his government has been particularly sloppy in its security practices.

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IV. Additional Items

1. France-Green Peace II: Analysts drew the meeting's attention to US registration of the second vessel heading toward France's nuclear testing site in the Pacific. The vessel arrives on or about 30 September. Given the determination of Paris to stop it short of its territorial waters, there is a substantial chance of a nasty incident involving the US.

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